In re Capital One TCPA Litigation Seventh Circuit appeal

Litigation over whether Capital One and its affiliates violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act settled for $75.5 million—about $4 for each of the 17.5 million class members who allegedly had a statutory claim for $500 or more. Six law firms asked for 30% of that, or over $22.6 million. We objected on behalf of a class member, Jeffrey Collins, introducing evidence showing that something more in the 4.6% range would more than fully compensate class counsel for the risk they incurred. The district court did not adopt our arguments, but agreed with us that there should be a declining percentage as the fund grew larger, and awarded "only" $15,668,265. That's for 4,268 hours of work by six law firms, including associates and paralegals, or over $3,671/hour. Other TCPA cases have awarded over $5,000/hour for similarly mediocre results.

This award is not because the underlying TCPA action was extraordinarily risky: the evidence showed that class counsel won settlements in 16 out of 38 TCPA class actions over the last four years and collected handsome fees for 64% of the hours they devoted to TCPA litigation. Moreover, the court found only that this case was “slightly” more risky than typical TCPA litigation. Nor did it reflect extraordinary litigation efforts: the case settled immediately after the filing of the MDL complaint. Nor did it reflect above-average efficiency: six firms claimed a right to fees, though only three had been appointed in the district court’s original Rule 23(g) order, and the lodestar was substantially higher than in other TCPA cases. Nor is this an extraordinary settlement: as mentioned, class members’ multiple $500 statutory claims were settled for about $4/class member before attorneys’ fees.

We do not contend that a court can never award such a generous hourly rate. But the Seventh Circuit has “held repeatedly that, when deciding on appropriate fee levels in common-fund cases, courts must do their best to award counsel the market price for legal services, in light of the risk of nonpayment and the normal rate of compensation in the market at the time.” We do not believe a sophisticated arms-length transaction would produce this sort of windfall for these sorts of results, and we have appealed, filing our opening brief Monday.

The case presents another interesting issue: can class counsel agree not to compete for lead-counsel status, and then divvy up a lump-sum fee request in a secret side agreement without approval or review of the court and the class? We think Rule 23(h) and Rule 23(e)(3) do not permit that.

Daniel Fisher has a great summary of the appeal on Forbes.com.

Oral Argument in Pearson v. NBTY, Inc.

Are you trick-and/or-treating in downtown Chicago this Halloween?

If so, visit the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to watch oral argument in Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., No. 14-1198 (7th Cir.). That's 9:30 a.m. in the Main Courtroom on October 31, 2014, at 219 S. Dearborn Street.

Ted Frank will be arguing for appellants in full costume (i.e. business formal court attire) as The Class Action Avenger.

You can read the background about this settlement in our last post about it. Basically, it's under $900,000 for class members, $1.1 million for third parties, and $4.5 million for plaintiffs' lawyers. Class members also get some labeling changes to the sued-over glucosamine bottles, changes which are alleged by the plaintiffs' lawyers to be worth $21 million. For example, instead of saying "Osteo Bi-Flex works by providing the nourishment your body needs to build cartilage, lubricate, and strengthen your joints," the label could say "Osteo Bi-Flex works by providing the nourishment your body needs to support cartilage, lubricate, and strengthen your joints" (italics added free-of-charge). See the opening brief for what "is perhaps the best 13,000-word summary of CCAF philosophy."

Plaintiffs, calling this settlement a "tremendous result," cross-appealed when the district court awarded them $2.1 million in attorneys' fees and expenses instead of $4.5 million. That $4.5 million, after all, "was negotiated at arm's-length by the parties" and, since the requested fees were only up to 2.56 times greater than the plaintiffs' lawyers' billing rate for the labor they expended, the requested fees were "certainly not excessive."

The briefing proceeded as follows:

• Opening Brief of Objectors-Appellants
• Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants (1 of 2) (2 of 2)
• Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees
• Response and Reply Brief of Objectors-Appellants
• Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants (1 of 2) (2 of 2)

Oral argument audio will be available at this link on October 31 or November 1: follow our blog for updates.

Victory! Redman v. Radioshack

CCAF won a tremendous victory for class members in Redman v. Radioshack, just eleven days after oral argument!

Judge Richard Posner, a legal authority renowned worldwide, wrote an excellent and accessible opinion, explaining that class action plaintiffs' attorneys' fees must be proportionate to the benefit they've realized for their clients, and that a coupon is a coupon regardless of the percentage discount that it represents.

You can read more about the underlying case here. The oral argument made headlines last week, and is also a fun listen. (Ted Frank appears at 9:40 and 54:55.)

Redman v. RadioShack, Inc. / oral argument today

As we discussed earlier, class counsel agreed to a settlement over RadioShack credit-card receipt legality that would have paid themselves $1 million, but the 16-million-member class 83 thousand coupons with a face value of $10. The district court approved the settlement because (1) it held the $2.25 million spent to distribute those coupons was a class benefit and (2) the coupons weren't "coupons." Oral argument is scheduled this morning in the Seventh Circuit. Some time this afternoon or tomorrow, a recording of the argument will be available online.

• Opening brief
• Plaintiffs-appellees' brief
• Defendant-appellee's brief
• Reply brief

The reply brief was fun, as plaintiffs were forced to defend an indefensible argument. From pages 5-6:

1.                  Plaintiffs rely on a logical fallacy.

It is not unfair to summarize plaintiffs’ proposed syllogism as follows:

1.         There exist websites that offer coupons where each coupon provides only a partial discount. PB26.

2.         There exists legislative history that criticizes a coupon settlement where the coupons offered provided only partial discounts. PB24-25; PB28.

3.         Therefore all “coupons” provide only partial discounts.

4.         Therefore a voucher for a free product is not a “coupon.” PB29-31.

The formal fallacy in plaintiffs’ logic is even more apparent in the following analogy:

1.         There exists a dog racing track where each racing dog is a greyhound.

2.         Actor Leonard Nimoy owns a dog that is a greyhound.

3.         Therefore all dogs are greyhounds.

4.         Therefore a collie is not a dog.

Nimoy’s most famous character had a catchphrase for this.[5]

---

[5] Cf. Leonard Nimoy, Highly Illogical on Two Sides of Leonard Nimoy (Dot Records 1968). Or, as Woody Allen once said, “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore all men are Socrates.” Love and Death (United Artists 1975).

Eubank v. Pella Corporation (7th Cir. 2014)

Judge Posner writes a very interesting Seventh Circuit opinion reversing a settlement approval on multiple grounds. A lot of friends forwarded the decision to me. I got to write back that I had argued it.

This wasn't a Center for Class Action Fairness case; the Center is a non-profit and restricted by federal tax law to cases where the client would not be able to retain a private attorney. But an objector's counsel retained my private solo law practice to assist with the briefing for one of the objectors; I then argued the appeal in Chicago in April along with counsel for the class representatives frozen out of the deal.

But even if it's not a CCAF case, it's worth discussing here. The opinion is going to be very helpful to class members, including several CCAF cases pending on appeal. While a lot of the press coverage has focused on the scathing remarks Judge Posner had for the unique conflicts of interest of class counsel, the opinion more importantly also singled out as improper several practices the Center has repeatedly complained about: the use of separate funds for attorneys' fees with reversion to the defendant; the use of imaginary hypothetical valuations of settlements based on bogus assumptions about the number of claims that would be made; grouping disparate sets of class members (in this case, thirteen or so different categories of settlement relief) into a single settlement class; and "quickpay" provisions where class counsel takes its check early in the proceedings while the class is not entitled to relief until years down the road. And more.

Brian Wolfman points out that the opinion notes the silliness of approving settlements based on low opt-out rates.

The opinion also had kind words for the important role played by objectors in policing abusive class-action settlements. And as I joked to friends, this victory was particularly special for me, because the client wrote me a check.

Coverage: Forbes; Overlawyered; Chicago Daily Law Bulletin; Litigation Daily ($); Legal Newsline/Washington Examiner; ABA Journal; National Law Journal; law.com; law.com; Workplace Class Action Blog; Blawgletter.

Opening brief in Redman v. RadioShack

RadioShack committed the sin of printing credit-card receipts with expiration dates on them, which exposed it to possible liability of $100 a receipt ($1000 if willful), a bankrupting sum. Class counsel settled for coupons. Our clients objected that the settlement did not comply with CAFA's limitations on coupon settlements, and was structured so that class counsel's benefit would outstrip that of the class. As is typical in coupon settlements these days, the settling parties denied that the coupons were coupons. For some reason, the district court bought the argument, and awarded $1M in attorneys' fees while the 16-million-member class will receive 83 thousand coupons with a face-value of $10, give or take. We've appealed, and filed our opening brief April 16.

Victory in the Seventh Circuit

As both Daniel Fisher and the Economist documented recently, the percentage of M&A transactions worth over $500 million that result in shareholder derivative suits has risen from 39% to 96%. [Fisher; Economist; Reuters (quoting me); OL; see also Johnson @ SSRN]

It's surely not the case that every merger is the result of a breach of fiduciary duty. What's happening is that entrepreneurial lawyers have discovered a profitable means of rent-seeking: with the help of a cooperative shareholder, bring a meritless shareholder derivative suit on some technical ground or the other, threaten to impose millions of dollars of discovery expenses and hassle on the officers and directors of the company, and collect an attorneys' fee for settling the case for a token change of no benefit to the shareholders. As I told Reuters in 2011, "Judges should consider whether these provisions actually create value for shareholders, or amount to a rearranging of the deck chairs to create the illusion of value to justify attorneys' fees."

Under FRCP 23.1(a) and its state-law equivalents, a shareholder derivative suit isn't supposed to proceed unless the shareholders bringing the suit adequately represent the shareholders. If the suit is meant to profit the plaintiffs' lawyers at the expense of the corporation (and thus the shareholders), how can the bringers of a strike suit be adequate representatives of the shareholders? I've thus argued that the correct role for courts in such situations is to throw these cases out entirely (or approve the settlement but award only a token amount in attorneys' fees).

I found myself the "beneficiary" of one of these $0 strike-suit settlements in Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley; the settlement would have paid the attorneys $925,000 under a clear-sailing clause, and, when the district court rejected my attempt to intervene to dismiss the suit, I appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 

Yesterday, I won a complete victory with a landmark Frank Easterbrook opinion that I hope will provide protection for shareholders against future shareholder derivative strike suits. The suit, the Court said, "serves no goal other than to move money from the corporate treasury to the attorneys’ coffers.... It is an abuse of the legal system to cram unnecessary litigation down the throats of firms ... and then use the high costs ... to extort settlements (including undeserved attorneys’ fees) from the targets." It thus reversed the district court's denial of my motion to intervene, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case, as I had asked below. [Reuters; Fisher @ Forbes; analysis by Wolfman; WSJ Law Blog (failing to recognize that the case involves a lawyer they profiled in October); Bashman; Overlawyered; Litigation Daily ($) ("Ted Frank, the indefatigable scourge of underwhelming class action settlements, scored a remarkable win on Wednesday"); Volokh on a punctuational quirk] 

This is the fifth federal appellate opinion in a CCAF case; CCAF is now 4-1 in federal appeals, which is remarkable, given that CCAF-affiliated attorneys represent the appellant in each case and there are rarely as many as four reversals of class action settlement-related district court opinions in a single year from all objectors combined.

CCAF is assisting an objector in a Texas-state-court strike suit currently on appeal, and we hope to extend this precedent to other state courts. The main difficulty we face is that individual investors rarely get adequate notice of these bad settlements: courts condone notice provisions that virtually guarantee that an investor who uses a broker will not get notice in time to file an objection. (In the Sears case, I benefited because of a rare agreement to extend notice at the district court level.) We would like to work with institutional investors to promote this precedent and put an end to the practice of rent-seeking strike suits that hurt shareholders. Please contact me if this describes and interests you.

May update

• A disappointing loss in Cobell v. Salazar, the first time I lost a federal appeal I've argued. We're still evaluating our options. Lots of links and analysis at Point of Law.
• Briefing and oral argument in Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley. I'm looking forward to the Seventh Circuit opinion.
• Odd shenanigans in Brazil v. Dell: see Point of Law; Reuters coverage; Reuters follow-up coverage.
• We completed Sixth Circuit briefing in the Pampers Dry Max case, and will discuss in a future post.
• The district court approved the Costco "hot fuel" settlement, though it at least refused to credit the junk economics expert; several other defendants are settling, and, if they're similar settlements where the benefits go entirely to the class counsel, we'll file objections there, too. Some objectors have appealed; we don't believe there's appellate jurisdiction yet. 

Two important appellate briefs filed this week

• Shareholder derivative suits present interesting conflicts of interest. The suit is purportedly brought on behalf of shareholders, but when the case settles, the corporate defendant—i.e., the plaintiff shareholders—are the ones paying the bill. Thus, if the suit does not actually extract any wealth from directors or officers for their supposed breaches of duty, shareholders are frequently worse off. This is the case in Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley, a derivative suit against Sears Holding Corp. where the alleged breach was failure to recognize the risk of Clayton Act litigation. The irony, of course, is that the actual shareholder derivative suit is far more expensive than the possibility of Clayton Act litigation. I objected; the posture is muddied by some procedural issues relating to the Seventh Circuit's intervention requirement, as you can see, but the fundamental point—shareholder derivative suits should not be permitted to be maintained when they are designed to benefit the attorneys, rather than the shareholders—remains valid, and we believe this is the first case to present this principle in the shareholder derivative context. The case is No. 10-3285, Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley (7th Cir.).
• Claims-made settlements are the successor to coupon settlements in structuring settlements to divert the lion's share of relief to the attorneys, rather than the class. The parties typically structure a claims process that will reward less than a tenth of the class (in this case, less than 3% of the class), hide the claims rate from the lower court by scheduling the fairness hearing well before the claims deadline (though that evasion didn't happen in this case), and then ask for attorneys' fees on the illusion that the entire class got relief. Thus, we have cases like Brazil v. Dell, where the class got less than $500,000, but the attorneys received $7 million. We think that is per se unfair, and have asked the Ninth Circuit to weigh in. The case is No. 11-17799, Brazil v. Dell (9th Cir.).